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Abstract
This paper uses Australian data from the Negotiating the Life Course Project 1997
to investigate the impact of marriage on men’s and women’s earnings. We extend
earlier earnings research and investigate whether the effect of marriage is constant
for men and women at different points on the conditional earnings distribution by
using robust and quantile regression techniques. We find no association between
marriage and wages for women, but for men a large and significant premium exists
with married men earning around $5,700 per annum more than their unmarried
counterparts, after adjusting for human capital, job and family characteristics.
Overall, there are very few differences in the association between marriage and
earnings for men and women across the wage distribution.  Although, importantly,
we find that the returns to marriage tend to be smaller and non-significant for
men at the top of the distribution than for men in the middle of the distribution.
1. Introduction
Previous research has consistently found that married men earn more than
single men (Gray, 1997; Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Loh, 1996; Blackburn
and Korenman, 1994; Chalmers, 2002; Hill, 1979).  Moreover, the higher
earnings of married men persist even when differences in education, labour
market experience, occupational and demographic characteristics are
controlled.  The general consensus is that, controlling for observable
characteristics, married men are more productive than unmarried men
(Chalmers, 2002; Daniel, 1995; Gray, 1997).
Two main explanations for the productivity of married men have emerged.
The specialisation argument is that married men are more productive in
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the labour market due to role specialisation in households. In married
households women specialize in domestic duties and men specialize in the
labour market, enabling married men to be more productive at work than
unmarried men. The second explanation is that there are selection effects
whereby the unobservable characteristics of men that are valued in the
marriage market are also valued in the labour market.  Under this scenario
men who are successful in the labour market are also more likely to marry.
While evidence has been found for both explanations, on balance, the
available research tends to favour specialisation with the gender division
of labour in the household allowing a married man the time and energy to
pursue labour market goals (Becker, 1985; Blackburn and Korenman, 1994;
Chalmers, 2002; Gray, 1997; Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Loh, 1996).
For women, the relationship between marriage and earnings is more
complex. The findings of previous studies have been mixed, and sometimes
contradictory (Budig and England, 2001; Dolton and Makepeace, 1987;
Goldin and Polachek, 1987; Gray, 1997; Hill, 1979; Waldfogel, 1997).  Early
research investigating the relationship between marriage and women’s
earnings found little or no association (Dolton and Makepeace, 1987; Goldin
and Polachek, 1987; Hill, 1979), whereas more recent studies, using
longitudinal data, have found significant positive associations (Budig and
England, 2001; Waldfogel, 1997).  Moreover, studies investigating the
determinants of women’s earnings tend to find a significant wage penalty
for motherhood, where mothers earn less than non-mothers, rather than a
strong association between marriage and earnings (Budig and England,
2001; Harkness and Waldfogel, 1999; Korenman and Neumark, 1992;
Waldfogel, 1997).  The evidence suggests then that marriage may increase
women’s earnings, but this pattern is strongly counter-balanced by the
negative impact of motherhood.
Despite the burgeoning literature examining the association between
marriage and earnings, especially for men, very little is known about the
association between marriage and earnings at varying points on the
distribution.  In this study we investigate the relationship between marriage
and earnings for both men and women. We extend earlier research by
comparing the effect of marriage at different points on the earnings
distribution using quantile regression methods.  This is important because
both the specialisation and selection hypotheses can be qualified to imply
different marriage premiums depending on where on the income
distribution we examine the relationship.
2. The Marriage Premium for Men
There are several reasons to believe that the association between earnings
and marriage for men may differ depending on where they are situated
within the earnings distribution.  For instance, if specialisation benefits are
the primary mechanism for the association between marriage and earnings
for men one might expect similar returns to marriage for men at all points
on the distribution.  Feminist research has long recognised the
‘incorporation’ of wives into husbands’ work and the importance of their
role as providers of domestic labour, emotional support and in some cases,
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a direct contribution to the husbands job through a range of essential, but
unpaid activities, such as entertaining clients, secretarial work and account-
keeping (Finch, 1983; Delphy and Leonard, 1992).  In Married to the Job Finch
argues that this kind of incorporation is not restricted to wives of
professional workers, but rather extends across the occupational structure
to include wives of those employed in services, trades and manual work.
In arguing for specialisation effects associated with marriage, Daniel (1995)
came up with the term augmentation capital to describe the ability of a wife
to enhance her husband’s productivity in the work place by providing a
flow of services ranging from organising activities, running errands,
performing housework, and other household chores.  He argues that even
when a woman marries a man with lower earnings, she is still likely to
have augmentation capital and provide her husband with a marriage
premium (Daniel, 1995: 119).  Under this scenario returns to marriage would
be expected to differ depending on the degree of specialisation within the
household. However, since augmentation capital contributes directly to
men’s productivity we can also qualify the standard specialisation argument
to anticipate larger premiums at the top of the earnings distribution than at
the middle or bottom. If, as human capital theory argues, earnings reflect
marginal productivity, we can think about augmentation capital as
enhancing the marginal productivity of the ‘last’ married employee, relative
to the ‘last’ nonmarried employee.  Enhanced marginal productivity
associated with augmentation capital may arise because married men have
more time to devote to paid work than single men, are able to commit more
fully to it in other ways (such as psychologically or emotionally), or have
greater flexibility with respect to paid work than single men, so that they
are better able to adjust to changing work demands. In all these cases though,
we might expect that the additional ‘effort’ married men are able to make
in paid work by comparison to single men translates into a larger premium
at the top of the earnings distribution, either because it does genuinely
imply a greater difference in the marginal productivity of married and single
men in highly paid jobs, compared to those in lower paid jobs, or because it
is associated with employers’ perceptions of greater productivity
differences.  Differences in effort between those in highly paid jobs are likely
to be associated with larger earnings differentials than similar differences
in effort among those in lower paid jobs because productivity differences
(real or perceived) are larger in the former case. We refer to this as the
earnings enhanced specialisation argument, in contrast to the standard
specialisation argument, which implies a constant premium across the
earnings distribution.
If selection factors are the primary force underlying the marriage premium,
one might also expect that men at the top of the earnings distribution would
have a larger premium than men at the lower end because men who earn
more money are more likely to be married (Becker, 1981).  Prior studies
provide evidence for this scenario.  For example, Nakosteen and Zimmer
(1997), using the 1979, 1982 and 1984 waves of the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics investigated the probability of marriage for single men who had
above average earnings and found that those with higher than expected
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earnings were significantly more likely to marry within the study time
frame.  Selectivity implies that unmeasured characteristics that are valuable
for both marriage and employment explain the marriage premium for men.
The likely mechanism here is that employers use marriage as an indicator
of other desirable characteristics that employees possess. In highly paid
jobs, being unmarried may therefore carry a greater ‘penalty’ since it signals
the absence of such characteristics more strongly in a pool where a higher
proportion of men are married.  We describe this as the earnings enhanced
selection effect to contrast it against the standard selection argument of a
constant marriage premium.
3. Marriage and Women’s Earnings
Early research examining the determinants of women’s earnings found that
marriage had little or no association once adjustments were made for human
capital (education, work experience, tenure), job characteristics (hours
worked, occupation, employment conditions), and family status (the
presence or number of children). For example, Hill (1979) using data from
the 1976 Panel Study of Income Dynamics found no significant association
between marriage and wages. Controlling for education, work experience
and number of children, her results show that married, white women earn
more than unmarried women, but less than divorced, separated or widowed
women. Dolton and Makepeace (1987) also found no association between
marriage and wages among female college graduates. Goldin and Polachek
(1987), on the other hand, using 1980 U.S. Census data found that single
women had a wage advantage over married women, but these differences
were small once adjustments were made for variability in expected levels
of accumulated human capital.
More recent investigations have focused specifically on the wage penalty
for motherhood. Budig and England (2001) used the National Longitudinal
Survey for Youth, 1982-1993, and adjusting for a wide range of human
capital, family, and job characteristics, found a marriage premium for
women of around 4 per cent. They also found that being divorced, separated,
and widowed had a large positive effect on women’s earnings compared
to being married or never married.  Waldfogel (1997) also found a marriage
premium for women, but found that divorced, separated and widowed
women had higher earnings than both married and never married women.
A possible explanation for the consistent finding across both studies that
women who are divorced, separated, and widowed usually have higher
wages than married women is that previously married women move into
the workforce out of economic necessity when they experience the loss of
their partner, whereas they otherwise may not (Waldfogel, 1997).
Taken together this evidence suggests that the relationship between
marriage and women’s earnings appears to be changing. While earlier
research found little, or no, association between marriage and earnings,
recent studies have found significant positive associations. There are several
possible explanations for this shift. First, there have been major social
changes for women since the 1970s, such as increased participation in higher
education and employment, which may have led to a shift in the
determinants of female earnings.  Secondly, studies show that male earnings
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have declined over the last few decades, whereas female earnings have
increased (England, 2001; Oppenheimer, 1997).  This reduction in male
earnings relative to female earnings may encourage men to select partners
who are able to make economic contributions to the family, thereby
generating a selection effect for women who have earnings potential into
marriage.  On the other hand, the observed change in the relationship
between marriage and wages for women could be attributable to differences
in statistical methods. Korenman and Neumark (1992) criticized the use of
cross-sectional techniques in examining the relationships between marriage,
motherhood and wages for women for underestimating the effects of these
determinants on wages.
In addition to expecting an association between marriage and earnings for
women, there are several scenarios under which one might expect the
association between women’s earnings and marriage to differ depending
on where they are situated within the earnings distribution. Under the
specialisation argument women would be expected to experience a negative
return to marriage across all levels of the earnings distribution due to the
negative impact of housework duties on women’s wages.  While recent
research into household specialisation indicates that in households where
women work full-time the division of household labour is more egalitarian
(Bianchi et al., 2000), women still do more domestic labour overall and are
more likely to adjust their working arrangements to accommodate demands
from home (Western and Baxter, 2001).  Therefore, women who work part-
time are more likely to spend more time and energy on domestic tasks
(Baxter, 1991) and face a wage penalty from marriage.  On the other hand,
women who are employed full-time may have a smaller marriage penalty
because they are more likely to be in households where the division of labour
is more equal, and they are better able to pursue labour market goals.  Under
the standard specialisation argument, we would expect the marriage penalty
to be consistent across the earnings distribution for both full and part-time
employed women, but smaller for full-time women than part-time women.
Unlike for men, there is no earnings-enhanced specialisation effect.
With regard to selectivity, the increase in women’s labour force involvement
and earnings potential, relative to men’s reduced earnings potential
(Oppenheimer, 1997; England, 2001), may predispose men to select wives
who have high earnings, or potential for high earnings as marriage partners.
South (1991) has found that men take into consideration their prospective
partner’s employment potential when deciding whether to marry. Under
an earnings-enhanced selection scenario the marriage premium would work
in the same way for women as for men, with women at the top end of the
earnings distribution experiencing a larger marriage premium than women
at the lower end of the distribution.  Further this would apply irrespective
of whether the woman works full or part-time, because even if a woman is
working part-time she may make a more attractive spouse if she can earn a
higher income in the time she works.
The above arguments suggest that effects of specialisation and selection
are much more complex for women than for men.  As indicated earlier
specialisation acts primarily to men’s advantage and to women’s
disadvantage in relation to earnings.  Therefore, the act of specialisation
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operates to limit women’s earnings potential.  Given this, women selected
into marriage on their earnings potential will also have a reduced likelihood
of realising that potential, compared to women who do not marry, because
of the disadvantages associated with specialisation within marriage.  For
example, for women, unlike men, the potential marriage premium due to
selection may be counter-balanced by the overall negative impact of
domestic work and motherhood resulting in a small or zero return to
marriage for women at the upper ends of the earnings distribution and a
penalty for women at the lower ends if they have children.  Some evidence
exists for this possibility in the research literature.  Budig and England (2001)
found an interaction effect between marriage and children, with the size of
the marriage premium declining as the number of children in the household
increased so that by three children, there was actually a wage penalty for
marriage.
In summary, research examining the association between marriage and
earnings focuses on the selection or specialisation debate for men, and the
wage penalty to motherhood for women.  Within these literatures no studies
to date have investigated the association between marriage and earnings
across the distribution, even though there are clear theoretical reasons for
doing so. We develop the earnings enhanced selection and specialisation
arguments for men, and the earnings enhanced selection argument for
women to take account of these possibilities. We examine these ideas
empirically using the Negotiating the Life Course survey 1997.  First we
examine the nature and extent of the effects of marriage on earnings,
emphasising differences both between the sexes, and between individuals
according to marital status. Second we investigate the relationship between
marriage and earnings at different points on the conditional distribution,
rather than simply focusing on the mean.
4. Methods
Analytical Sample
The data used in this paper come from the Negotiating the Life Course
1997, Version 1 (McDonald et al., 2000). For the current analyses we restrict
the sample to men and women who were employed at the time of survey.
Respondents who are on paid maternity or ‘other’ leave, such as sick or
long service leave, are included. The self-employed are excluded. There
were 1298 respondents in the final analytic sample.
Variables
The dependent and independent variables are described in Appendix 1.
Summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 1.  The dependent
variable is gross (i.e. before tax) annual earnings. While a measure of hourly
wage rates may be preferable for testing the effect of marriage on earnings,
we are restricted here to examining annual earnings because data were not
collected on number of weeks worked each year. We are therefore unable
to accurately estimate hourly wage rates for respondents.  We focus on raw
earnings rather than logged earnings because the arguments about the
different size of the marriage premium at different points on the earning
distribution relate to absolute differences rather than percentage differences.
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The primary independent variable, marital status, consists of a series of
dummy variables for never married, previously married (divorced,
separated, and widowed) and currently married or cohabiting,1  with never
married as the reference group.
Table 1  Means and Standard Deviations for all Variables
Men Full-time Women Full-time Women Part-time
(N=583) (N=422) (N=293)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Annual Earnings 45535.81 35816 33509.73 15148 13848.01 8909
Married .65 .57 .66
Ever Married .09 .16 .14
Never Married .26 .27 .20
Age 36.50 9.0 35.86 9.8 36.40 9.9
Years of Education 14.98 3.3 14.93 3.2 13.88 3.2
Degree or better (1=yes) .25 .30 .16
Missing education (1=yes) .02 .02 .05
Years of Work Experiencea 18.86 9.2 14.96 8.0 11.17 6.4
Pre-school child (1=yes) .21 .09 .23
No Children .50 .61 .28
One Child .15 .16 .23
Two Children .23 .18 .31
Three, or more Children .12 .05 .18
Private Sector .73 .61 .71
Government Sector .27 .39 .29
Managerial Occupation .12 .04 .01
Professional Occupation .34 .47 .29
White Collar Occupation .14 .39 .54
Blue Collar Occupation .38 .08 .15
Missing Occupation .02 .02 .01
a.  Because age and work experience are highly correlated we orthogonalised them
by using residualised experience from an OLS regression of experience on age for
inclusion in the models.
Human capital is measured by variables for age, education and work
experience. We fit linear and quadratic terms for age. We use two education
measures, a continuous variable for years of education constructed using
retrospective education life history data from the age of 15, and a level of
education variable to estimate years of schooling before the age of 15. We
also include dummy variables for university bachelor degree or higher and
missing values for education in some models. We construct a measure for
actual years of work experience using retrospective life history data collected
from the age of 15, and incorporating years of part-time and full-time
experience, with years of part-time experience weighted to 0.5.
This study uses two measures of family status: a series of dummy variables
for number of children in the household including, no children, one child,
1 Cohabiting unmarried couples are included with married couples in this analysis
as we were interested in the presence, or not, of a partner within the household.
There are studies that have found qualitative differences between registered
marriages and defacto unions in relation to the marriage premium (i.e. Brown and
Booth, 1996; Nock, 1995).  Further, there is some evidence that there is an association
between cohabitation and a decline in the marriage premium for men (Cohen, 2002).
However, we did not have an adequate sample size to address differences between
married and cohabiting respondents here.
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two children, and three or more children, with no children as the reference
group; and a dummy variable for whether or not a pre-school child is present
in the household, because the presence of younger children in the household
has been found to influence women’s earnings (Harkness and Waldfogel,
1999).
Finally we include measures of job characteristics.  We include a measure
for occupation based on major occupational categories 2  of the Australian
Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO), second edition (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 1997).  We collapse these into four categories: (1)
managers and administrators, (2) professionals, (3) white collar employees,
(4) and blue collar workers. Managers and administrators are the reference
category. We also include a dummy variable for missing responses on
occupation, and a dummy variable for whether or not the respondent was
a government employee.
Analyses
To examine the marriage premium we fit five robust regression and quantile
regression models to separate samples of full-time male and female
employees and part-time female employees. We pursue separate analyses
because earnings determination processes differ across the three groups
(Harkness and Waldfogel, 1999; Waldfogel, 1997). We use robust regression
based on iterative reweighted least squares to model the conditional mean
earnings in each group, and simultaneous bootstrapped quantile regressions
of the deciles (10th, 20th, 30th etc. to 90th percentiles) to model other points on
the distribution. The five analytic models include a baseline model
incorporating marital status only, a second model that adds the human
capital variables (age, education and experience), and a third model that
adds job characteristics. Model 4 is the second model plus family variables
(numbers of children and the presence/absence of preschool children), and
Model 5 includes all variables (marital status, human capital, family, and
job characteristics). This staged procedure allows us to examine how the
marriage premium changes as we introduce human capital and other
variables that previous research has found to be differentially related to
the earnings of women and men (Hill, 1979).
We use a robust estimator for the mean, rather than conventional OLS
because preliminary analyses using OLS revealed the presence of various
influential data points and outliers.3  The IRLS estimator starts with an OLS
fit and uses Cook’s distances to identify extreme observations. It then runs
iterative reweighted least squares, initially weighting observations using a
Huber function and then Tukey’s biweight until convergence (Hamilton,
2002; Stata Corporation, 2001:152-157). The bootstrapped quantile regression
estimator minimises a sum of weighted absolute deviations based on the
2 The Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO) is a skill-based
measure that groups together occupations requiring similar levels of education,
knowledge, responsibility, and on-the-job training and experience.  The occupational
groupings are hierarchically ordered based on their relative skill-levels, with those
occupations having the most extensive skill requirements located at the top of the
hierarchy (ABS, 1997).  The nine-level ASCO classification comprises Managers and
Administrators, Professionals, Associate Professionals, Trades and Related, Advanced
Clerical, Intermediate Clerical, Intermediate Production and Transport, Elementary
Clerical, and labour and Related.
3 Influential observations were identified by looking at leverage values, Cook’s
distances, studentised residuals and DFBETAs from OLS runs.
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relevant quantile, while bootstrap resampling (Davison and Hinkley, 1997)
is used to generate the estimated variance-covariance matrix of parameter
estimates (Stata Corporation, 2001:11-27). The analyses are based on 1000
bootstrap resamples.
5. Results
Table 2 presents results of the robust regression models. For ease of
presentation we only show coefficients for the marital status dummy
variables. The baseline model shows that full-time employed men has a
significant marriage premium of around $12,800 per annum, compared to
never married men, and that men who were previously married earn just
over $6,000 per annum more than never married men. Adding human capital
variables, as shown in Model 2, attenuates the return to marriage for men
by around half to just over $7,000 per annum. The association between
previously (ever) married men and earnings becomes smaller and non-
significant with the introduction of human capital factors, and remains non-
significant for all other models. The R-squared also increases substantially
(from 0.10 to 0.27) with the introduction of human capital factors and
increases marginally again with the introduction of the job variables.4
Adjusting for job characteristics (Model 3) and family status (Model 4), in
addition to human capital factors does not have a significant effect on wages
for married men. The final model includes human capital, job characteristics
and family status variables; after adjusting for all variables married men
earn around $5,700 per annum more than single men.  Thus, about 55 per
cent of the male full-time marriage premium is accounted for by controlling
for human capital, family and job variables ((12779-5701)/12779 * 100 = 55.4).
Table 2  Marital Status Dummy Coefficients for Robust Regression Models
M3: M4:
Baseline, Baseline,
M2:    Human Human
M1: Baseline   Capital & Capital & M5:
Baseline & Human Job Charact- Family All
Model Capital eristics Status  Variables
Full-time Employed Men
Married 12779.32 ** 7215.79 ** 5888.90 ** 7498.08 ** 5701.94 **
Ever Married 6337.75 * 2465.68 2232.53 2505.25 2152.30
Never Married - - - - -
Observations          583 583 583 583 583
R-squared          .10 .25 .34 .26 .34
Full-time Employed Women
Married 2750.29 * 439.27 -238.63 850.53 156.80
Ever Married 4264.65 * 2128.05 1543.90 2638.72 2190.75
Never Married - - - - -
Observations          422 422 422 422 422
R-squared          .01 .34 .39 .34 .39
Part-time Employed Women
Married 3378.77 * 240.63 -1489.21 1150.61 -304.64
Ever Married 4430.12 * 1090.76 713.72 1898.35 1744.66
Never Married - - - - -
Observations          293 293 293  293  293
R-squared          .03 .10 .19 .12 .20
*P<.05, **P<.01.
4 R2 statistics for this estimator should be cautiously interpreted.
Australian Journal of Labour Economics, June 2005172
In contrast to results for men, there is generally no significant association
between marriage and the earnings of women employed full-time. This
finding supports earlier research using cross sectional data (Dolton and
Makepeace, 1987; Hill, 1979; Korenman and Neumark, 1992). A small
premium for previously (ever) married women disappears once human
capital differences are controlled.  For women employed part-time, however,
the baseline model (Model 1) indicates a large significant association
between marriage and earnings, where both currently and ever married
women have higher earnings per annum than never married women. Again,
however, these differences are fully accounted for by human capital
differences in married and single women. After controlling for age,
education and experience, there are no significant associations between
marriage and wages for part-time employed women in the remaining four
models (Models 2-5).
Consistent with earlier studies, our results thus show a significant positive
association between marriage and men’s average earnings. For women the
relationship between marriage and earnings tends to be small and non-
significant after adjusting for compositional differences in human capital.
This is again consistent with previous cross-sectional studies using OLS
(Dolton and Makepeace, 1987; Hill, 1979; Korenman and Neumark, 1992).
Studies examining the determinants of women’s earnings more often find
that motherhood, has a stronger influence on women’s earnings than
marriage, being associated with a substantial wage penalty (Budig and
England, 2001; Waldfogel, 1997).  Models 4 and 5 include dummy variables
for the number of children, and presence of a pre-school child, but our results
(not shown) do not provide support for a wage penalty for motherhood for
either full-time or part-time women. As expected none of the family status
variables were significantly associated with men’s wages either.
To further investigate the relationship between marriage and earnings we
next estimate quantile regression models for the conditional deciles. Figures
1-3 present graphs of the quantile regression coefficients for the final models
separately for each of the three subsamples. In each figure, the first graph
shows the conditional quantile regression coefficients for married
respondents compared to never married ones, and the next graph shows
the coefficients for those ‘ever previously married’ (separated, divorced,
widowed) compared to never married. For brevity we only present results
from the final model.  For all graphs, the solid line represents the robust
regression estimate (i.e. the relevant dummy variable coefficient from the
robust regression model), the dotted line is the conditional quantile
regression coefficient at each of the nine deciles, and the dashed lines are
the upper and lower pointwise confidence limits for the quantile coefficients.
Where the confidence band incorporates zero the relationship between
marriage and earnings are not statistically significant. The figures also enable
us to see how closely the robust coefficient tracks the quantile coefficients
along the earning distribution.
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Figure 1  Final Model Full-time Employed Men
Figure 1 presents the results for men.  Overall the robust regression
coefficient tends to be within the quantile regression confidence band and
to follow the quantile estimates fairly closely. This suggests that the robust
coefficients generally estimate the marriage premium across the earnings
distribution relatively well. However, looking first at the marriage/defacto
coefficients in Figure 1 it is also clear that the point estimates from the
quantile regression tend to be smaller than the robust regression marriage
premium in the lower deciles and smaller in the higher deciles. In particular,
men who are located at the top end of the earnings distribution tend to
have smaller and non-significant returns to marriage, compared to men in
the middle of the wage distribution. This suggests that wage determination
processes vary somewhat across the male earnings distribution with
marriage mattering more at the bottom and middle and less at the top.
Figure 2 presents the corresponding graphs for full-time employed women.
Again the results show that the robust estimator models the relationship
between marriage and earnings well at differing earnings levels. The
patterning is similar to that for men, with women at the top of the earnings
distribution tending to have lower returns to marriage than those in the
middle, but overall the size of the coefficients are small. For full-time women
the relationship between marriage and earnings is non-significant across
the distribution.
Australian Journal of Labour Economics, June 2005174
Figure 2   Final Model Full-time Employed Women
Figure 3 presents results for women employed part-time.  The robust
regression is also a good predictor of the relationship between marriage
and earnings for part-time employed women of different income levels.
These results further suggest that part-time women tend to have a larger
earnings return to marriage than full-time women, but generally the
relationship is not significant. Overall, the quantile regressions support the
findings of the robust regressions, showing virtually no association between
marriage and earnings for women irrespective of the amount they earned.
Figure 3  Final Model Part-time Employed Women




Our examination of the relationship between earnings and marriage show
a large and significant marriage premium for men, but little or no association
between marriage and earnings for women. Adjusting for a range of human
capital, job, and family characteristics married men in our study earn around
$5700 more per annum, on average, than unmarried men. These findings
support the findings of previous studies examining the determinants of
earnings for men, and other cross-sectional studies on the determinants of
women’s earnings (Blackburn and Korenman, 1994; Dolton and Makepeace,
1987; Gray, 1997; Hill, 1979; Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Korenman and
Neumark, 1992). One possible explanation for the lack of association
between marriage, family and earnings for women in our study is our use
of cross-sectional data. Other studies have found some limitations with
using cross-sectional data to examine determinants of women’s earnings,
because they tend to under-estimate the effects of marriage and family
(Korenman and Neumark, 1992). Previous studies that found significant
associations between marriage and women’s incomes tended to be
longitudinal (Budig and England, 2001; Korenman and Neumark, 1992;
Walfogel, 1997).  Alternatively our lack of findings of any effects for marriage
for women could be attributable to joint processes of selection and
specialisation whereby women’s earnings are limited by specialisation even
if they are selected into marriage because of their earnings potential, thereby
cancelling out any differences at the mean.
Most significantly, our study extends the existing literature to examine the
relationship between marriage and earnings for men and women situated
at different levels on the earnings distribution. Overall, we found that the
effects of marriage are similar for men and women irrespective of where
they are situated on the wage distribution, however, the quantile regression
results do provide additional insight into the relationship.
For men, the effect of marriage on earnings is different at the extreme ends
of the distribution but not in the manner predicted by either the earnings
enhanced specialisation or selection hypotheses.  In contrast to predictions,
men who are at the higher end of the earnings distribution do not have the
same large and significant benefits associated with marriage as men in the
middle of the wage distribution. For men at the lower end of the distribution
the effects are of a similar magnitude as middle-income men, but the
association is not significant.  These findings do not provide unequivocal
support for a selection or specialisation argument.  Having said that,
however, the full model for married men (Figure 1) shows a pattern of
association across the distribution that is fairly consistent with a standard
specialisation argument.  Here the returns to marriage are virtually the same
for men at the second to eighth deciles.  The standard and modified
specialisation arguments, however, do not hold for married men at the
extreme high-end of the earnings distribution, those around the 9th decile,
who have small and non-significant returns to marriage compared to men
in the middle of the distribution.  This finding is also in contrast to the
expected association between marriage and earnings for a selection
argument, where high earnings men should have a larger return to marriage.
This finding is consistent with other theories, such as economic rent theory.
An economic rent exists where payment is made for access to economic
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resources in fixed supply, and persons with ownership of, or effective control
over the economic resource have possession of the right to the payment
(Sorensen, 1996; Sorensen, 2000).  Two kinds of employment rents are
relevant to our findings. First, monopoly rents exist where employees are
able to demand, and/or employers are willing to pay salaries above the
competitive wage rate for certain skills, talents or abilities possessed by
individuals that are in short supply (Sorensen, 1996). Monopoly rents apply
particularly to professional occupations that are credentialised so that only
workers with specialized knowledge and formal qualifications can access
the occupation. This creates scarcity that drives up the price of professional
labour. Second, loyalty rents, or efficiency wages, may also be paid to those
in administrative and managerial positions. Management and
administration positions are difficult for employers to regulate so a wage
above the competitive wage rate is offered to buy loyalty, and increase
incentives to perform (Bowles and Gintis, 1990).  A substantial component
of the earnings of men with high earnings may reflect these types of rents
which are associated with the nature of the job position, rather than
characteristics of the individual such as marital status, and human capital.
Under this scenario one would expect that the returns to marriage would
be lower for men as they move up the earnings distribution, because other
wage determinants become more important.
There is some indication of employment rent processes in our results. In
the final, full regression model we find that none of the human capital
characteristics (i.e. education, work experience) are significant for men at
the 9th decile, whereas human capital is associated with earnings for men at
all other deciles. Other than age the only significant factors for men in the
9th decile are job characteristics; the dummy for white collar employee (-
0.40), and the dummy for public sector employment (-0.17), both had large
negative coefficients (results not shown). These results are consistent with
the existence of employment rents in highly paid managerial and private
sector jobs for full-time male employees.  Alternatively, for men at the top
of the earnings distribution, earnings may less adequately represent the
benefits associated with work.  This may be because we do not use a more
comprehensive measure of compensation, including performance pay,
allowances and the like, might have shown a premium for this group of
men.
For women, in general, the relationship between earnings and marriage
was small and non-significant.  Contrary to our expectations, there is no
association between marriage and earnings for women irrespective of
whether they have children, or work full or part-time.
In addition to the substantive issues above, the quantile regressions enabled
us to compare the effectiveness of using a statistical technique that uses the
conditional mean function of the wage distribution with one that examines
the relationship at several points on the conditional distribution. In most
cases we find that the robust regressions adequately predict the effects of
marriage on wages across the entire earnings distribution.
More broadly our results also offer some insight into the continuing gender
gap in earnings (Cotter et al., 1995; Le and Miller, 2001; Wellington, 1994).
While there is no evidence here to suggest that being married is necessarily
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a disadvantage for women’s earnings, they certainly do not receive the
premium for marriage that men do.  It is therefore not unreasonable to
conclude that the persistence of the gender wage gap is due at least in part,
to differential returns to marriage for men and women.  Additionally, our
findings indicate that men situated at the upper end of the earnings
distribution have diminished returns to marriage than men lower in the
distribution, and may therefore have different earnings mechanisms
operating.  This result indicates that further research is required that
examines the determinants of earnings for men at different levels of income,
rather than simply focusing on the mean, to develop our understanding of
the relationship between marriage and earnings for men. Given our results,
selection and specialisation effects for men are not enhanced at the top of
the distribution, as we expected. Rather, the implication is that the selection
and specialisation mechanisms associated with marriage are offset by other
factors that determine the earnings of highly paid men.  This suggests that
we need to think further about appropriately qualified variants of the
specialisation and selection hypotheses when examining the male marriage
premium.
Appendix 1  Description of Variables
Variables Definition of Variable
Dependent:
Annual Earnings Gross annual income, logged
Primary Independent:
Married Dummy variable for people in married or defacto relationships
(1=Married, defacto)
Ever Married Dummy variable for people who were previously married
(1=Divorced, Separated or Widowed)
Never Married Dummy for people who have never been married (Reference
Category)
Human Capital:
Age Age of respondent
Age#2 Age of respondent centred and squared to adjust for non-linear
relationship with wages
Years of Education Continuous measure of years of education of respondent,
incorporates level of education measure and retrospective data
from age of 15 years, retrospective component includes years of
full-time and part-time study weighted by 0.5.
Degree or better Dummy for if respondent has bachelor degree or higher
(1=Bachelor degree)
Years Work Experience Continuous measure of years of work experience, includes full
time years of work, and part-time years of work weighted by
0.5.  Residualized with age so work experience is net of the
influence of age.
Years Work Experience#2 Yrs Work Experience residualized, centred and squared.
Family Status:
Pre-school child Dummy for the presence of a preschool aged child in house
(1=preschool child present)
No Children Dummy for No children in Household (Reference Group)
One Child Dummy for One child in Household (1=1 Child)
Two Children Dummy for Two children in Household (1=2 Children)
Three, or more Children Dummy for Three or more children in Household
(1=3 or more Children)
Job Characteristics:
Government Sector Dummy for Government or Private sector (1=Government)
Managerial Occupation (Reference group)
Professional Occupation Dummy for professional occupation (1=Professional, associate
professional)
White Collar Occupation Dummy for White collar employee (1=Sales, Service, Clerical)
Blue Collar Occupation Dummy for Blue Collar employee (1=Trades, Labourer)
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